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IU THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STn.TE OF UTAH 
"!ARY J. ~1ACKEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
~ICHARD L. HARVEY, 
Defendant-~espondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAHT 
Case No. 14619 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for personal in-
jury and to property resulting from an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITIOH IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury who found the issues 
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant, no cause 
of action. ~ppellant moved for a new trial which the court 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment 
in her favor as a matter of laN on the issue of liability and 
a new trial on the issue of damages, or if that fails, a new 
trial on all issues of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were operating automobiles 
which collided at the intersection of 3300 South and 700 East 
Streets in Salt Lake County, at approximately 11:20 a.m. on 
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June lS, 197J. Traffic at the intersection was controlled by 
an electric semaphore signal with a green arrow turning signal 
for the 3300 South traffic. Appellant was traveling east on 
3300 South, which has two through lanes going east and a left-
turn storage lane for traffic turning north onto 700 East. Ap-
pellant observed the green turn arrow as she approached the left-
turn storage lane and proceeded slowly into the intersection to 
make a left turn, where she was struck by the respondent. Res-
ponde~t was traveling south on 700 East in the center lane which 
has three through lanes for the traffic going south with a left-
turn storage lane for the traffic turning east onto 3300 South. 
As he ap?roached the commencement of the left-turn storage lane, 
respondent observed the green light in his favor but did not look 
at it again and proceeded into the intersection where he struck 
the left-front of the appellant's vehicle. The intersection is 
extremely busy with a heavy flow of traffic. The traffic was 
stopped and backed up on 3300 South proceeding east and west. 
There also was traffic proceeding west on 3300 South and turning 
south onto 700 East or going the opposite direction than the ap-
pellant. There also was traffic stopped on 700 East facing north 
waiting to turn west onto 3300 South. 
ARGU11ENT 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTIO'l NO. 15 l'IAS SUB?1ITTED AND RECEIVED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF UTAH. 
The trial of this matter commenced on the 31st day of 
March, 1976, and at the end of the second day, being April 1, 
1976, all evidence was in and both the appellant and respondent 
rested. (T. 24) On the morning of April 2nd, which was the 
-2-
---
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ti~e set for oral argu~ent, the respondent submitted Instruc-
tion ~o. 15 to the court. Appellant took exception to it as 
to its contents and also that it was not timely filed with the 
court, but the court, contrary to Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts of the State of Utah, Adopted by order of the 
Judicial Council on September 15, 1975, and effective January 
1, 1976, submitted the instruction to the jury. 
Rule 5.4 Requests for Instructions provides: 
Requests for instructions shall 
be presented to court at the commence-
ment of the trial, provided, that addi-
tional or further instructions may be 
presented not later than the close of 
evidence. At the time of presenting 
requests, a copy of the same shall be 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
Respondent's Requested Instructions are dated the 
31st day of ~arch, 1976, and contained instructions 1 through 
19. No. 20, which was the court's No. 15, was submitted later 
as stated above. (T. 65-85) 
This rule was established pursuant to the authority 
vested in the Judicial Council of the State of Utah by Section 
78-3-21(3) (a) which provides: 
Establish general policies for the 
operation of the courts including 
uniform rules and forms for practice 
and procedure, consistent with la~1 
and the provisions of this act. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION 15 TO 'l'HE JURY. 
Instruction No. 15, 1~hich the appellant takes excep-
tion to, provides: 
You are instructed that even though the operator 
-3-
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of an auto~obile has the right-of-way, he still has the duty 
to keep and to maintain a reasonable, proper, and adequate 
lookout and to use reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a 
collision. One who has the right-of-way must use due care 
while crossing and must continue to keep a reasonable look-
out and reappraise the situation as he approaches an inter-
section and use reasonable and ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances to avoid a collision as he proceeds. 
There is imposed upon a driver the duty to be aware 
of the relative positions and speeds of vehicles approach-
inq and he must recurrently reobserve and reappraise in 
the light of the consistent changing conditions of a fluid 
traffic situation. Therefore, even if you should find 
from the evidence in this case that either driver had the 
technical right-of-way, you should also consider that such 
right-of-way is a relative right only, and if he was care-
less in failing to keep and continue to keep a reasonable 
and adequate lookout or fail to exercise reasonable and 
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid a collision 
and that such negligence, if any, proximately contributed 
in any substantial degree to cause the collision, he would 
be negligent. 
The importance of this instruction and the weight the jury 
put on it is apparent since they returned a verdict of no cause of 
action, which undoubtedly was based on an interpretation of what con-
stituted reasonable care or a proper lookout. 
Appellant contends that the instruction nullifies the rea-
sonable care standard, for it imposes an absolute duty to be aware 
of other vehicles instead of a duty of reasonable care and is tanta-
mount to a direct verdict against the appellant. The instruction 
takes the position that an intersection collision will not occur 
unless both drivers are negligent and fail to see each other. 
This was the position taken by the defendant in the case 
of Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952). The 
Martin case involved a collision at an open intersection where 
plaintiff had the right of way. The trial court refused to per-
mit plaintiff's case to go to the jury on the theory that plain-
tiff had a duty as a matter of law to see defendant's automobile 
approaching and that his failure to see the defendant's vehicle 
-4-
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sooner than he did was negligence as a matter of law. On ap-
peal the defendant contended that an open intersection colli-
sion will not occur unless both drivers are negligent and fail 
to see each other. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the 
contention that plaintiff had an absolute duty to see defen-
dant's vehicle. 
Although plaintiff had the right of way under both 
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon 
him the duty of due care in observing for other 
traffic. But in doing so he had the right to as-
sume, and to rely and act on the assumption that 
others would do likewise; he was not obliged to an-
ticipate either that other drivers would drive neg-
ligently, nor fail to accord him his right of way, 
until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or 
should have observed, something to warn him that 
the other driver was driving negligently or would 
fail to accord him his right of way. If this prin-
ciple is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is 
firmly established by the more recent expressions 
of this court. 
Also in the case of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 
163 P.2d 510, the plaintiff was traveling on an arterial high-
way and the defendant's ambulance approached from a cross street 
and ran a stop sign. The court instructed that both parties 
~rere negligent as a matter of law while the issue of proximate 
cause was submitted to the jury and a verdict for plaintiff 
was sustained on appeal. The court, in holding that plaintiff 
was not negligent as a matter of law in not looking for traffic 
approaching the arterial highway, stated: 
In the first olace, the trial court was distinctly 
in error in i~structing the jury that the plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence as a mat~er of law ... 
The (trial] court may have been m1sled by our case 
of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350. But 
the facts of that case were far different from those 
in this case. In that case there was no stop sign--
no designation of arterial highway 
-5-
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He 1-1as on an a.rt."rial. He could rely on the am-
bulance stopping before he reached the intersec-
tion until he was or should have been definitely 
aware that it was not going to do so. At that time 
he may have been well out in the intersection. Only 
at that point did his duty to stop or accelerate 
his speed--viz. attempt to avoid the accident, 
begin. 
Where a motorist has the right of way because he is 
proceeding with a green light, as is the situation in the case 
before the court, t~e right to assume non-negligence distinguishes 
the lookout duty from the ordinary open intersection cases. (See 
Hess v. Robinson, supra; Youngblood v. Robison, 239 La. 330, 118 
So.2d 1431, annotation at 2 ALR 3rd 12.) 
Instruction 15 was taken from the case of Badger v. 
Clayson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 422 P.2d 665. This was a collision at 
the intersection of 1300 East 4500 South, both being residential 
streets, and it. was admitted by both parties that they were 
familiar wi. :::, the! intersection and that it was a blind intersec-
tion. The defendant entered the intersection on a yellow light and 
was in the intersection on a red light when the plaintiff, traveling 
on the green light, collided with the defendant. The court, in 
taking the position that the hazardous intersection might well 
demand a higher duty of care, stated: 
. . there is plausibility to the idea that due to the 
special hazard in approaching a blind intersection, the 
standard of reasonable care might well demand special 
caution to be alert for oncoming traffic; ... There 
seems to be no harm in such an instruction in the ordi-
nary intersection case, and could be under the circum-
stances here where the plaintiff knew the intersection 
was very dangerous, did not slow down, conceded that he 
did not look, and entered the intersection after the 
defendant had entered it, but here the intersection was 
unusual where neither driver could see the other coming 
until he got to or in the intersection. Both of the 
drivers knew of the dangerous and hazardous nature of 
this particular "blind" intersection,--and both, know-
ing of this, \-lith the split-minute change in mechanical 
semaphore signals, may have had a duty to slow down 
-6-
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below the posted speed limits. Neither did. 
Appellant submits that there are three main distinc-
tions between the Badger case and the principal case. 
1. The accident took place on a residential street 
where there is less traffic and distraction for a driver to be 
aware of. 
2. Both drivers knew of the hazardous, blind inter-
section and should have taken extra caution. 
3. Defendant was in the intersection and plaintiff, 
failing to keep a proper lookout and observe whether the inter-
section was clear, struck the defendant. 
The case before the court involves an intersection of 
two major arterial highways where traffic is thick and backed 
up waiting for lights to change and even other traffic in the 
intersection making left-hand turns opposite to the appellant. 
Appellant approached the intersection in a cautious manner, 
observing the light in her favor and other traffic in the inter-
section. She was in the intersection and traveling at a slow 
rate of speed while making her left-hand turn and was struck by 
the respondent. 
I refer the court to the holding in the case of 
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884, that was up-
held in Larson v. Evans, 12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088, where 
the court held: 
A traveler approaching a signal-controlled 
intersection with the light in her favor has the 
right of way and can rely on it until something 
appears to indicate it is not safe to do so. 
Instruction 15 places too great of a burden on a 
driver in an intersection of this type because it becomes 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
impossible for a reasonable driver to observe every happening 
in a busy arterial intersection. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND IF THE APPELLANT 
FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT, IT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant's testimony was that as she approached the 
intersection, she saw the left-turn green arrow come on in her 
favor as she was about to enter the left-turn storage lane. 
(R. 3, 9) She continued very slowly as it was her intent to 
make a left-hand turn. (R. 5, 11) She noticed other traffic 
in the intersection proceeding west to make a left turn south 
onto 700 East. Also, cars were backed up on 3300 South waiting 
for the light, to proceed east through the intersection. (R. 4) 
In regard to the respondent's vehicle, on cross-exam-
ination, appellant stated that she did not remember seeing any-
thing that \vas close enough to hit her. (R. 11) Her testimony 
on direct examination was: "It was somewhere on my immediate 
left, but I don't know how far it was away." (R. 5) 
Respondent testified that he was traveling in the 
center lane and that he looked at the light as he approached the 
left-turn storage lane and it was green in his favor. He then 
stated: "I didn't think I had any trouble making it through, so 
I just kept on proceeding like I was." (R. 30) 
Harold P. ~1cEwan was an eye witness to the accident 
and he was on 700 East stopped in the left-turn lane. He stated 
that the lights were red for all northbound traffic on 700 East 
and he assumed that they would be the same for all southbound 
traffic on 700 East. (R. 14, 17) He observed a car proceeding 
-8-
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west on 3300 South, making a left-hand turn in front of him to 
go south on 700 East and a Chevrolet, driven by Miss Mackey, 
entered the intersection to make a left turn to go north on 
700 East. He then observed the Harvey vehicle enter the inter-
section and immediately looked and the light was still red and 
the through traffic to go east and west had not started yet. 
Then the respondent ran into the appellant. (R. 15) 
Deputy Ernest Clough investigated the accident and 
when he was asked whether he made a determination as to what 
happened, he indicated that the Hackey vehicle had pulled into 
the intersection to make a left turn onto 700 East and the 
Harvey vehicle southbound on 700 East went through a red light 
crashing into the side of the ~ackey car. (R. 22) 
Deputy Clough further testified that the 3300 South 
intersection is 49 feet wide and the left-front of respondent's 
vehicle was 17 feet 3 inches into the intersection and he 
skidded approximately 33 feet to point of impact and moved 
4 feet 20 inches after impact. (R. 22-23) 
It appears that appellant was denied recovery on the 
jury's finding that she was negligent in failing to keep a 
proper lookout and that such was the proximate cause of the 
accident. It is alleged under Point II that the jury was 
erroneously instructed with respect to the appellant's duty to 
maintain a lookout. However, in any event, a failure to main-
tain a proper lookout by the appellant could not have been a 
proximate cause of the collision. 
It must be assumed that appellant entered the inter-
section on the green semaphore at a reasonable rate of speed 
and with her vehicle under proper control, but she did not 
-9-
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maintain the lookout which the court required under its instruc-
tions to the jury. It is submitted that a lack of diligence to 
maintain a lookout could not possibly have been the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
The courts have held that failure to keep a proper 
lookout is not the proximate cause of an accident unless the 
driver, by maintaining a proper lookout, could have avoided the 
accident. See Morris v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 140, 356 P.2d 34. 
In the Morris case the plaintiff was proceeding through an 
intersection on a green light and failed to see the 
defendant's automobile approaching on the cross street 
until just before the impact. On appeal the Supreme 
Court held that the trial judge had reasonably and 
property concluded that plaintiff's observation of 
approaching traffic would not have forewarned him of 
the impending hazard and that a failure to keep a 
proper lookout under such circumstances was not a 
proximate cause of the collision. In so holding the 
court enunciated the rule of proximate cause which 
applies to the facts of the case at bar: 
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and to see 
what there is to see so as to be able to exercise 
ordinary precaution to prevent collisions such as 
this. This duty extends to the favore0 driver with 
the right of way as well as to t~e disfavored driver. 
But he who has the right of way need not anticipate 
sudden outbursts of negligence on the part of another 
driver. Indeed, it may be said that the failure to 
observe is negligence proximately contributing to 
the harm only where by observing the driver could 
have avoided or lessened the resulting harm. 
(Emphasis added.)" 
In the case at the bar appellant had no opportunity to 
avoid the collision, for she stated that she didn't remember 
seeing anything that was close enough to hit her until the res-
pondent was upon her while she was in the intersection. The 
reason she did not see him was because the respondent was not 
within the immediate proximity to be seen and to cause the 
appellant to be aware of an existing danger. 
-10-
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T~e record does not say the speed of the vehicles. 
However, it does indicate that the appellant was going at a 
very slow rate of speed, and in fact, counsel attempted under 
cross-examination to show to the jury that at the very slow rate 
of speed which the appellant was going, she could have avoided 
the accident. 
The only information we have as to the respondent's 
speed was that he skidded approximately 33 feet and moved 4 feet 
and 20 inches after impact. The movement after impact would in-
dicate that he was traveling way in excess of 25 miles per hour 
for the stopping distance at that speed would be 32 feet. 
The court can take judicial notice of how various 
rates of speed might have affected the accident and by simple 
mathematical calculations, it is readily ascertainable that if 
the appellant had failed to keep a proper lookout, it would 
not have been the proximate cause of the accident. (See 
Benson v. D. & R. G. ~\T. R., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790; l'lalker v. 
Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P. 2d 291) 
If the appellant's speed were 15 miles per hour, then 
she would have been traveling at the rate of 22 feet per second. 
If the respondent's speed were 35 miles per hour, then he would 
have been traveling at the rate of 51 feet per second. Three 
seconds before the accident the appellant would have been 66 
feet from the point of impact while the respondent would have 
been 153 feet from the point of impact, a distance that would 
not have caused any alarm to a reasonable person. 
Two seconds before the accident, the appellant would 
have been 44 feet from point of impact and the respondent 
would have been 102 feet from the point of impact, a distance 
-11-
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that would have still not alerted a reasonable person. 
At one second before the accident, the appellant would 
have been 22 feet from the point of impact or approximately 5 
feet from the commencement of the intersection, while the res-
pondent 1~ould have been 51 feet from the point of i~pact or ap-
proximately 34 feet from the commencement of the intersection. 
(Deputy Clough testified that respondent was 17 feet 3 inches 
in the intersection. [R. 23]) Even at that distance, a reason-
able person could assume that the respondent would bring his 
vehicle to a stop in view of the semaphore and busy intersection. 
Even if the appellant had seen the respondent at this point, she 
could not have avoided the accident because she would have 
traveled 17 feet, being the reaction time to apply her brake and 
an additional 12 feet before she could bring her vehicle to a 
stop, which would have placed her right in the path of the on-
coming respondent. 
This is looking at it in the light most favorable to 
the respondent, because no allowance is being made for the fact 
that he was braking his car, which would mean that he was actu-
ally back a farther distance in each situation than stated. 
Also, if respondent were going at a faster rate of speed, he 
would have been back still farther, making it more unreasonable 
for the appellant to have seen him. 
The appellant, having the light in her favor and 
having the responsibility to observe the other traffic in the 
intersection, had the right to assume that respondent would 
yield the right of way until in t~e exercise of due care, 
appellant should have known to the contrary. Thus, appellant, 
upon seeing the respondent's automobile, would have to deter-
-12-
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~ine that respondent, in view of his speed and approach, was 
not going to yield the right of way, whereupon appellant \<Tould 
first become obligated to take evasive action. It is obvious 
that she did not have an opportunity to apply her brakes or 
turn her vehicle a split second before the collision. 
I refer the court to the concurring opinion of Justice 
Woolf in the case of Hartin v. Stevens, supra, where he is dis-
cussing the case of Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 
514, wherein he states: 
Perhaps in the Hickok case, a reappraise-
ment of the situation if it had been made at 
the right moment would have alerted the favored 
driver to the fact that the disfavored driver 
was not going to yield the right of way and 
perhaps given him time to avoid the collision. 
I say "at the right moment" because a moment 
sooner than that "right moment" the driver of 
the favored car might still have thought the other 
driver \'/ould slow down to let him pass whilst a 
moment later than that "right moment" it would 
have been too late to avoid the collision. This 
points up, I think, the duty we put upon the favored 
driver in those cases. The disfavored driver has 
the duty to slow down; and while the favored 
driver cannot totally igr,ore the other and blindly 
traverse the intersection, he can, until he is 
otherwise put on notice, presume that the dis-
favored driver will slow down and permit him to 
pass, . 
It is submitted that at the time the appellant first 
had an opportunity to observe the respondent's vehicle, there 
was nothing appellant could do to avoid the accident and that 
the failure to keep a proper lookout was not the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that the rules of 
the district courts have been adopted pursuant to statute and 
have the force and effect of law, that they are fair for both 
-13-
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parties and should be upheld by the Supreme Court. If they are 
not upheld, then there is no reason to have the rules and they 
should be abolished or they will be abused and broken by all 
parties. 
Instruction No. 15 was prejudicial in that it placed 
too great of a burden on the appellant in the fact situation of 
this case and was tantamount to a directed verdict on the look-
out question. Even if the appellant had failed to keep a 
proper lookout, the evidence is overwhelming in her favor that 
her negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
Respectfully submitted 
Homer F. W1lk1nson 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two copies 
of the foregoinq to Henrv E. Heath, Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent at Stronq & Hanni, 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 8th day of April, 1977. 
Homer F. W1lk1nson 
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